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 The
adage is that “actions speak louder than words.” The principles
and concepts guiding the Armenian Revolutionary Federation’s (ARF)
recently announced roadmap to regime change in Armenia are
consistent with the historic mission of the ARF.
Unfortunately, however, it took the
protocols—an 11th hour development in the process of normalizing
relations between Armenia and Turkey—for the ARF to respond not
only to these documents, but to conditions that have been
festering for close to 20 years in the homeland (Armenia,
Artsakh (Karabagh), and Javakhk):
First, the abysmal socio-economic conditions
in Armenia that have plagued its workers and their families.
Second, the conditions afflicting the Javakheti Armenians, which
have steadily deteriorated during this time frame. Only recently
the Javakheti Armenian activist Vahagn Chakhalyan was the victim
of flagrant police and judicial misconduct for having spoken out
against the restrictive policies of the government. He was
convicted of acquiring and possessing weapons, “hooliganism,”
and violating public order (an event that occurred two years
prior to the instant charge). He is presently serving a 10-year
term in a prison where the most hardened criminals in the
Georgian penal system are sent (see “Javakhk Activist Vahagn
Chakhalyan: Justice Denied by Georgia,” the Armenian Weekly,
Sept. 18, 2009). And finally, the failure of Armenia to have
the Nagorno Karabagh Republic become a party to the
negotiations that will determine its future. This has been
Karabagh’s goal since 1994, when a ceasefire ended hostilities
and the republic gained de facto independence.
After that somewhat critical assessment, let
it be understood that the ARF is the one entity that has the
experience and the determination to guide Armenia out of the
quagmire into which the Sarkisian government has led the
country. For 120 years, the Dashnaktsutiun has been the
principal Armenian adversary of the Ottoman Turkish government
and all subsequent Turkish governments in representing the
injustices perpetrated against the Armenian nation. Its
founding in Tiflis (Tbilisi) in 1892 was to advance social
democratic principles by whatever means necessary to improve the
political and economic wellbeing of the Armenians in the
Anatolian provinces of Ottoman Turkey (the historic western
provinces of Armenia). In terms of its mission, history,
organization, and public support, the ARF is prepared to
undertake this vital effort at regime change in Armenia.
However, the means for affecting this change
represents a difficult challenge. The present situation demands
that the ARF interpret its roadmap to regime change as being not
only multi-faceted in its mission, but multi-operational in its
implementation. Effective regime change requires (1) preventing
parliamentary ratification of the protocols or significant
modification of the negotiation results; (2) strengthening
Stepanakert’s claim to Karabagh and the liberated territories,
and forcefully aiding in its determination to secure de jure
independence; (3) aiding the Javakheti Armenians to secure
improved economic and political conditions, and the right to
their language and cultural institutions; (4) implementing
socio-economic initiatives to improve the quality of life for
workers and their families in Armenia; and (5) preparing for the
forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections.
Given the evolving nature of this crisis, the
Dashnaktsutiun does not have the luxury of time to respond in a
step-by-step progression to achieve these objectives. They must
be prepared to launch an offensive that has multiple objectives
requiring simultaneous (and possibly divergent) courses of
action. This is a gargantuan task that requires the harnessing
of human resources and the raising of funds far beyond anything
the ARF has previously attempted.
The beginning salvos have already been fired.
The demonstrations in Armenia must increase in size and
frequency if they are to have any effect influencing the
Sarkisian government as well as sending a message to Ankara.
Demonstrations throughout the Armenian
Diaspora should complement these efforts as a means to provide
moral support for their compatriots in the homeland and to send
a message of disapproval to the Minsk Group countries.
Maintaining this level of participation requires that the ARF
articulate reasons why this ongoing process of normalization is
a threat to the political viability of Armenia as well as to the
future wellbeing of the Armenian citizen.
The ARF must organize conferences where
articulate speakers will present the Dashnaktsutiun’s position
with respect to its roadmap objectives to sympathetic
journalists, legislators, leaders of advocacy groups, and
influential business executives.
The tri-chairs of the Minsk Group—Russia,
France, and the United States—know full well the price they are
requiring Armenia to pay. However, this should not dissuade the
ARF from openly questioning why Armenia’s national interests
should be sacrificed for Turkey’s benefit. Once the Minsk Group
has forced Armenia to accede to Turkey’s interests, it will turn
its attention—as it has already begun to do—to resolving the
Karabagh issue with no consideration of the price the
Karabaghtsis will be required to pay.
To assist the ARF in providing position
papers to support the objectives of regime change envisioned in
the roadmap, “think tanks” must be organized and staffed by
competent professionals. There is no shortage of Armenian men
and women with expertise in any field that the ARF may require
as it formulates and implements this comprehensive program for
regime change. Position papers must be distributed to media
outlets, sympathetic foreign governments and legislators, and
especially to members of the U.S. Congressional Armenian Caucus.
These “papers” must explain the adverse impact this pressured
rapprochement will have on the political vitality of Armenia and
on the legitimate issues that successive Turkish governments
have refused to acknowledge. Garnering effective support for its
roadmap to regime change is predicated upon showing the
legitimacy of the Armenian Cause (Hai Tahd); the degraded
position of the Armenian worker and his family; and an
understanding of the background with respect to the Karabaghtsis’
determination to be independent and the legal and human rights
principles that support their actions. The position papers must
explain how and why the Javakheti Armenians are continually
being denied their basic economic and political rights as
citizens of Georgia, and of the government’s attempts to deny
them their use of the Armenian language and cultural
institutions. The adverse environment created by the Georgian
government is aimed at acculturating the Armenian minority or,
failing that, encouraging them to leave their historic lands.
It cannot be assumed that those who may be in
a position to aid the ARF—journalists, political leaders, major
donors, and the rank and file Armenian public—understand the
history of events and the rationale that motivates the
Dashnaktsutiun in its determination to effect regime change. In
support of this objective, a steady stream of journalists,
foreign legislators, advocacy leaders, and businessmen must be
invited to Karabagh to hear and see for themselves the story of
the Karabaghtsis. The resettlement program to increase the
population of Artsakh by some 100,000 people (about 30-35,000
families) has lagged, and the population of Artsakh has not
increased appreciably since 1994. This was a major initiative of
the Stepanakert government that would have served to strengthen
its hold on the liberated territories (see “The
Political-Strategic Resettlement of Karabakh’s Security Zone,”
the Armenian Weekly, June 30-July 7, 2007).
Javakhk presents a different set of problems.
Who but a handful of Armenians know precisely what our brothers
and sisters in this historic Armenian region within Georgia are
forced to endure? As with Artsakh, a steady stream of official
visitors should be invited to see the conditions for themselves
and to hear the concerns of the people. Should the Georgian
government refuse entry to these foreign journalists and
legislators, all the better to show the attitude of a government
that contravenes the positive changes in its treatment of
minorities—which it has agreed to introduce as a member of the
European Union’s “European Neighborhood Policy.” Whether these
visitors are allowed entry or are refused, Tbilisi cannot escape
the onus for the adverse condition of the Javakheti Armenians.
Implementing the roadmap to regime change
demands a highly coordinated offensive that cannot be
accomplished without massive support within and beyond Armenia.
It requires a well conceived and executed information generating
and distributing system that effectively supports the roadmap’s
objectives. There are formidable obstacles that the ARF must
overcome in carrying out its proposed changes. The party not
only faces an entrenched power structure and a political
philosophy that makes legitimate opposition difficult, but it
must contend with the Minsk Group chaired by France, Russia, and
the United States, which has been responsible for pressuring
Armenia to capitulate to Turkish interests in order to
facilitate their respective national interests. Not to be
underestimated are the visceral attacks that may be made by pro-Sarkisian
and anti-Dashnaktsutiun elements that seek to join the ARF to
many of the problems they now claim they are prepared to solve.
Armenia is not without some leverage in
responding to these pressures. Iran has much to lose if this
rapprochement as presently formatted is carried to its expected
conclusion. Iran has a sizeable Turkic population adjacent to
Azerbaijan whose allegiance to Teheran has always been
problematic. A Turkish victory could have a significant impact
on the internal political stability and spatial integrity of
Iran, where slightly less than 50 percent of the population are
ethnic Persians. Russia’s role in the present situation is
perplexing. It is reminiscent of the Bolshevik’s inability to
accurately gauge Ataturk’s philosophical predilections when it
gave Armenia’s historic lands to Turkey (Treaty of Kars) in
1921 as part of its failed attempt to encourage their Turkic
neighbor (Azerbaijan as well) to become ideological soul mates.
Moscow misread the situation then and it appears that it may be
misreading the situation now. What Russia expects to gain by
betraying Armenia, its only reliable ally in the south Caucasus,
is difficult to fathom. There is room in the south Caucasus for
only one major power: Turkey (a United States surrogate at least
for the time being) or Russia. The unlikely key that may
determine what will happen with respect to the ongoing process
of rapprochement may very well depend on Artsakh’s response. The
determination of its people to defend their independence is the
one element that has not been fully taken into consideration
simply because it is believed that the republic will not or
could not respond to an Azeri attack. Only time will tell.
Part II of this commentary will appear next
week.
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