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BY MICHAEL MENSOIAN

For close to a century,
Armenians have lived with the psychological and emotional trauma
caused by the genocide. In addition, Armenians have suffered the
indignity of having their centuries-long occupation of historic
Armenia not only challenged, but their physical imprint upon the
land destroyed by their oppressors, and their right to justice
ignored or questioned.
The genocide took the
lives of over 1.5 million innocent Armenian men, women, and
children. It caused the forced abandonment of Armenian homes and
lands, and the confiscation and destruction of Armenian churches
and the sacred lands where their deceased ancestors had rested
for centuries. The genocide stole the birthright of thousands of
young Armenian women who only survived by being forced to serve
alien masters. Today, Yerevan is on a path that seeks the
normalization of relations with a government that has maintained
a century-long policy of denying, rewriting, and obfuscating
these horrific events that have been recorded in the archives of
history.
Ankara and Yerevan
recently agreed to a “road map” to facilitate negotiations that
will lead to a normalization of relations. One wonders how
Yerevan can expect to achieve normalcy when it is apparent that
the Turkish leadership has no intention of recognizing the
Armenian Genocide (see “Why Would Turkey acknowledge the
Armenian Genocide,” the Armenian Weekly, Feb. 10, 2006) or of
changing its position supporting the territorial integrity of
its ally Azerbaijan with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. These are rational assumptions since the Karabakhtsis
and the Armenian people, both within Armenia and throughout the
Diaspora can only speculate as to the concessions to be given
and the benefits to be received as the result of these
negotiations.
To date, the political
leaders in Yerevan have either been unwilling or unable to
understand the potential dangers that are attached to this
process of normalization that far exceed the difficulties the
country is currently experiencing. One can only surmise the
intense external pressures being placed upon Yerevan to seek
normalization as it navigates the Machiavellian world of
international politics.
Despite the emphasis on
genocide recognition in the United States Congress, as well as
President Barack Obama’s well-documented personal views on the
Armenian Genocide, his administration has turned its back to the
plight of the Armenian nation. Contrary to his stated position
of not wanting to do anything that may influence ongoing
negotiations between Turkey and Armenia, Obama’s comments during
his recent visit to Turkey and the policy of his administration
send an entirely different message. His long-awaited message on
the 94th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide was political
verbiage at its best. The politically naive leaders of the
Diaspora in the United States were deceived once again (see
“Caveat Emptor When Shopping for Normalization in the Turkish
Marketplace,” the Armenian Weekly, March 25, 2009).
This headlong rush toward
normalization since the meeting of President Abdullah Gul and
President Serge Sarkisian in Yerevan received its first serious
setback on April 27 when the ARF withdrew its participation in
Yerevan’s coalition government. Although this was not an
unexpected development, it should have occurred months earlier.
By withdrawing their support of Sarkisian, the ARF announced
that it will “…be guided exclusively by…national interests and
goals when addressing the normalization of Armenian-Turkish
relations and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)
conflict.”
By assuming their role as
the loyal opposition, the ARF has injected itself into the
normalization process, unfettered by the constraints that
hobbled it as a coalition partner. Sarkisian must realize the
serious consequences should he present any agreement as a fait
accompli. This would be a serious setback for the
democratization process in Armenia. The normalization of
relations with Turkey is a historic moment in contemporary
Armenian history. The ARF, by
reassuming its traditional, role takes center stage in this
process. It becomes essentially the watchdog, the last line of
defense, protecting both the future of the country and of all
Armenians. As the only effective counterbalance to
the present administration in Yerevan, the ARF has put the
administration on notice that it will monitor the government’s
actions, propose alternative strategies, and publicly evaluate
the national security issues that may be adversely impacted by
the direction the negotiations appear to be going.
A baseline for determining
the value of normalization is the Turkish leadership’s
willingness to engage Armenia in resolving the legitimate issues
between the two countries that have existed for nearly a
century. One does not expect the slate to be wiped clean by
Turkish acquiescence to every issue that Yerevan, prodded by the
ARF, might propose. However, it is necessary that Turkey commits
itself to a good-faith effort to ameliorate conditions that have
festered for nearly a century. Absent that, there is no benefit
to be gained by normalizing relations. Presently there is no
indication that the leadership or those factions that influence
the government, such as the military, are willing to face these
issues head-on. There is no need to repeat the issues that must
be addressed, but they are summed up in the full meaning of Hai
Tahd: recognition, restitution, reparations, and rectification.
The Turkish offer to
normalize relations, which Armenia’s political leaders seem so
eager to accept, recasts Faust’s bargain with the devil as a
victory. Contrary to Armenia’s oft-stated objections, Turkey
still speaks of the preconditions necessary for normalized
relations. Ankara is engaged in a very astute diplomatic
offensive that began with Gul’s visit to Armenia last year (see
“Normalization Can Never Be Worth Turkey’s Asking Price,” the
Armenian Weekly, Dec. 6, 2008). Turkey has neither the need, and
even less the desire, to normalize relations with Armenia if the
cost is genocide recognition or Karabakh’s de jure independence.
Ankara’s goal is to carry on negotiations under conditions aided
and abetted by the United States that require Armenia to
consider difficult choices. It is a diplomatic offensive that,
just prior to the announced intervention of the ARF, was close
to achieving its objective. For the Turkish leaders it was a
win-win situation. If their gambit succeeded Armenia would have
been checkmated. If Armenia refused to play the game as Ankara
defined it, Turkey would have burnished its image as a country
“willing to forget the past” and of reaching out to its
intransigent neighbor.
The “interested” nations
and the “think tanks” that play academic games solving crises
eagerly encourage Armenia to come to terms with Turkey. This was
the end-goal of Turkey’s present diplomatic offensive-to
pressure Armenia to accept compromises that are inimical to its
long-term interests. However, Turkey is no longer free to pursue
its diplomatic offensive unchallenged. The ARF has the
organizational structure, credibility, and experience gained
during the past century as Turkey’s principal adversary in the
international arena to augment, redirect, and evaluate
strategies that will protect the national security and enhance
the future of the Armenian nation.
What effect Russia and
Iran have on these negotiations is best known to Yerevan.
However, there is no question that Russia would do whatever it
can to have Azerbaijani energy resources redirected through its
extensive pipeline system that supplies Europe. Fortunately,
this runs counter to Turkish-United States interests. For the
present at least, the United States is a more reliable ally for
Turkey than Russia would be. Also, Armenia is the only military
foothold that Russia can depend upon in the south Caucasus. For
Russia to support Turkey to bring these negotiations to a
successful conclusion at Armenia’s and Karabakh’s expense could
be a dangerous game to play. A resurgent Turkey would confront
Russia in the south Caucasus supported by the United States, the
European Union, and their military component, NATO. Turkey would
have the necessary springboard to extend its influence into
central Asia where it would also confront Russia’s head-on.
In 1991, the independence
of Armenia was heralded by Armenians with joy and expectation
that finally their Armenia was on the threshold of a new and
promising era. A few years later, Artsakh (Karabakh) won its
independence from Azerbaijan in a devastating war for
liberation, and just recently Barack Obama, who had stated in no
uncertain terms during his presidential campaign that the
Armenian Genocide was a fact of history, was elected president.
From these once promising beginnings, the Armenian people are
witness to bilateral negotiations between Ankara and Yerevan
that appear to lack any meaningful quid pro quo for Armenia.
Although it is important that Armenia and Turkey normalize
relations, it cannot come about by the Sarkisian Administration
sacrificing the future security or potential of the Armenian
nation. It cannot come about by sacrificing Artsakh. And it
cannot come about by sacrificing Hai Tahd. That is the heavy
burden that the ARF finally assumed on April 27.
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